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Introduction
Many people subscribe to the notion that the Johannesburg central business district, or CBD, has
declined substantially in recent years. A closer examination of the available data, however, suggests that the
process has in fact been evident for some 40 years (Lauf 1959). By the 1950s, white residential growth had
already begun to bulge out to the north (Figure 1), while the 1960s saw the beginnings of a similar movement
of office accommodation. Furthermore, some of the major developments that emerged in the downtown area
during the 1970s, and that were intended to reinforce the status of the CBD, in fact did much to hasten the
decline of downtown retailing. The neo-apartheid city that we see unfolding today has deep historical roots.
The Beginnings of Decentralization
Even though small clutches of shops and some services had inevitably developed in the suburbs by the
1940s, Johannesburg at the time was still for all intents and purposes a city with a single major business
district. With the continued expansion of the built-up area in the post-war years, and the increasing
ownership of private motor cars by white people, it followed that clusters of decentralized shopping and the
number of business nodes would increase and expand. It has been claimed that confidence in the central core
was dealt a serious blow in the 1950s when the Council itself decided to move most of its technical
departments out of the crowded City Hall, and nearby buildings, and place them in a single complex on the
Braamfontein hill (The Star 1987). That decision, and other changes spelled out below, might have been the
reason why the President of the South African Town Planning Institute believed that by 1959 the first sure
indications of decentralization were visible (Marshall 1959).
Developments in Braamfontein:
CBD Extension or Decentralized Node?
The change in the nature of Braamfontein was heralded by two supposedly complimentary
developments. First came the decision by the city authorities in the early 1950s to move many of the
administrative functions of the municipality to a civic centre complex that would be built across a 7.5 ha. site
on the crown of the Braamfontein Hill, and second, the Council zoned additional stands in Braamfontein for
commercial activities.
Although the position for the civic centre was selected in the early 1950s it was only in 1960 that the
ground was cleared of its small houses. The design of the civic buildings was selected by means of an
architectural competition. The winning entry, announced in 1962, was a civic building, dominated by a 17-
storey office arm that can be seen from afar in all directions. It was completed in 1972. As such the large
'captive market1 of municipal office-workers did little to positively influence the initial commercialization of
Braamfontein that had proceeded more rapidly from the mid-1950s onwards.
The birth of Braamfontein as a business node had been encouraged in part by granting business rights
under the Johannesburg Town Planning Scheme in 1946 (Muller 1968). In point of fact it was only in the
1950s, after more sites were zoned for business in Braamfontein, after the new bridges were built, and when
the increased demand for office space in the CBD could not be readily satisfied, that the modern commercial
townscape emerged. It does seem that business people were aware that a location in Braamfontein was a
bridge too far from the CBD for the new node to be a genuine extension of the central business district.
Consequently the first flush of businesses that opened in Braamfontein, made up of those relocating from the
CBD and of'first-time openers', were office-based activities that required only a degree of proximity to the
main institutions of the CBD. They were businesses that did not depend primarily upon personal visits by
their clientele or persons from associated businesses in the CBD in order to succeed (Hart 1969).
In 1954 the Electricity Supply Commission (Escom) decided to vacate its 72 metre-high ziggurat
'skyscraper' in Rissik Street and move its headquarters to the bulky 'arm-chair-shaped1 Escom Centre. The
new building was only a metre taller than the older one but contains 37 155 sq.m. of office space. It was built
across a whole city block between Wolmarans and Smit Streets just east of Harrison Street (Chipkin 1993).
Other early arrivals in Braamfontein were the head offices of South African Breweries, Imperial Chemical
Industries, and Shell. In the mid-1960s the Schlesinger Organization erected their 82 metre-high building
across a whole block bounded by Rissik, Wolmarans, Smit, and Joubert Streets. It contains 24 floors of
offices and resembles a miniature version of the Pan-Am building (now the MetLife Building) located
between the Helmsley Building and Grand Central Terminal on Park Avenue in New York City (Mandy
1984; Chipkin 1993).
Braamfontein had only 4 923 sq.m. of office space in 1950 but by 1965 that area had grown to 163 113
sq.m. (City Engineer 1967). The growth was driven in part by the boom in the South African economy after
South Africa left the Commonwealth in 1961. Just over a year later office space in Braamfontein had
increased by an additional 121 000 sq.m. (Hart 1969), reflecting in part the 1966-67 economic surge in South
Africa that saw 25 per cent added to the stock exchange index during the great stock market boom of 1965
to mid-1969.
On the retail front the developments in Braamfontein were never exciting. Even though shops made up
the second-largest category of land use they accounted for only 9.5 per cent of the total floor space by 1965
(Hart 1969). There was no genuine fashion shopping. What retailers there were tended to be located in
smallish rented premises at pavement level in the office blocks that had become part of the new high-rise
skyline in the former working-class suburb. Also present in the suburb were a scattering of blocks of flats
and some hotels.
The continued construction of office blocks throughout much of Braamfontein in the 1970s and early
1980s need not be detailed here. Suffice it to say that with the passage of time construction of high-rise
buildings spread north and west through Braamfontein. Even now the suburb continues to be characterized
by its office buildings more than by its retailers. By the mid-1990s Braamfontein was afflicted by elements
of the same malaise prevalent in the CBD of Johannesburg.
Other Decentralized Nodes
Outside of the developments that took place in Braamfontein there was relatively little in the way of
genuine suburban shopping and business centres elsewhere in the Johannesburg municipal area by 1960. As
might be expected the next most significant node was located in the middle- and lower-reaches of Hillbrow
where the demands of an expanding and cosmopolitan population of residents was able to support 45 000
sq.m. of shopping by 1959. Significantly almost half of that retail space was occupied by businesses dealing
in demand or shoppers goods and only a third of the retailing was of the convenience type (Marshall 1959).
Other suburban centres where demand goods were strongly represented were mainly in those suburbs
located farther out, including Rosebank to the north, La Rochelle to the south, and Auckland Park to the
west. The total amount of suburban shopping in each of the centres just mentioned ranged between 5 000
and 15 000 sq.m. In fact the total retail area outside of the CBD and Braamfontein in 1959 amounted to only
180 000 sq.m. (Le^ equal in extent to 29.7 per cent of the retail core) spread over nodes in 15 suburbs
(Marshall 1959). That said, however, the composition of the decentralized retailing was already telling a
story of what was to come. Only 39 per cent of it was made up of convenience shops with 47.6 per cent
falling in the domain of demand goods and the balance in impulse shopping. The high percentage of shops
dealing in demand goods meant that the 'friction of space1 between the suburbs and the CBD was beginning
to have an effect. At least some customers were already prepared to forgo the cumulative attraction, and
glamour, of the CBD in order to save on the effort of travelling the longer distance just to satisfy a need, or
desire, that could be satisfactorily met in the suburbs.
The expanding suburbia, that by the mid-1950s had already in places crossed the northern boundary of
the Johannesburg municipal area and was administered by the Peri-Urban Areas Health Board, set the base
for creating two new towns. The first was the town of Randburg, established in 1959. In 1969 on the
recommendations of a provincial commission of enquiry (van der Spuy 1967) the town of Sandton was
created. The effect of the two additional municipalities on the Johannesburg CBD grew as the new towns
grew. In each instance they established points around which they developed their own CBDs, and in each
case their CBD lay at an interceptor point between their own expanding residential areas and the main route
back towards the Johannesburg CBD.
In the mid-1960s the CBD not only reached what has been regarded as its peak combination of lateral
extent and high-order businesses but was about to be affected by some critical location and planning
decisions associated with major business developments in and on the edge of its CBD.
'Superblocks1 and the CBD: 1960s and 1970s
The combination of narrow streets, small city blocks, and small stands, all designed in keeping with the
nineteenth century belief that Johannesburg would never be more than a temporary mining camp, bedeviled
city planners of the 1950s in their attempts to maintain the downtown as an efficient and modern business
district measured against ever-rising world standards. One of the ways individual developers had long
attempted to overcome the space restrictions was to buy and spread their buildings over more than two
adjacent stands. That said, however, it was not unusual for a city block, typically with an area of between
3 900 and 4 950 sq.m., to contain six or eight buildings. As such, that city block might easily have a total of
a dozen or more elevator systems and stairwells, and a multiplicity of other services ranging from cloakrooms
to fire escapes. By contrast if it was possible to erect a single building extending over the whole city block
it might need fewer than half the elevators and less space for service areas.
Until the early part of the 1960s the height of buildings was not allowed to exceed that which would
create an angle greater than 59 degrees measured from the ground on the opposite side of the street
(Mallows 1973). Although some of the bulk could be traded off against more height, most buildings erected
during the booms of the 1930s and the post-1945 war period were similar in terms of both height and bulk.
The exceptions were the tallest buildings in the city where designers had adopted the ziggurat style and
spread the building over more than two adjacent stands of a city block.
With the sharply increased demand for space in the CBD, that characterized the mid-1950s through to
the early-1960s, the need for taller buildings that would make fuller use of the bulk factor allowed, and
thereby make the developments economical, was underscored. The situation just described appears to have
both encouraged and assisted the Chief Planner of Johannesburg to successfully persuade the Council to
change the rules (Mandy 1984). The negotiated compromise was based on the notion that developers would
favour a scheme that encouraged the construction of really tall buildings even if they were then limited to
only one complex on a whole city block. Effectively what was negotiated was a reduction in the earlier
restrictions. Provided a building was set back at least 2.7 metres from the sidewalk extra height and extra
bulk would be allowed in exchange for providing additional "areas of public interest open to the sky" at street
level (Mandy 1984). Once the compromise became policy, terms such as podium buildings, 'slab blocks', and
'wing blocks', were used to describe both large developments and the shape of the buildings on whole city
blocks (Grant and Flinn 1992).
The expression 'superblock' was coined for sites where development was to take place across a whole
city block, and had been used earlier to describe some of the major building sites taken up in Braamfontein
in the 1950s. In reality, however, the term 'superblock' was later more frequently associated with those
developments that were based on the amalgamation of two or more city blocks, and even the intervening
roads, into a single large property. On such a holding considerable advantage could be taken with the new
height and bulk controls. In architectural and planning circles the adjustments to the building restrictions
were seen as the green light for building to at last take place on a scale that was appropriate to a metropolis.
Johannesburg, it was felt, had finally broken with the constraints of a digger's camp and could create a
cityscape appropriate to a place of a million people (Chipkin 1993). And so what has been described as
Johannesburg's fourth major building cycle was set in motion (Prinsloo 1971).
The First 'Superblock1 Developments in the CBD
The first sizable project under the new regulations was completed in the CBD in 1961 (The Star 1987).
It was located on a whole city block between Commissioner and Fox, West, and Ferreira Streets (Figure 2)
and is the 17-storey convex-slab building named Edura House. The planning for a second whole-block
development began in 1962. It was for the new headquarters of the Standard Bank sited on the block
bounded by Fox, Commissioner, Hollard, and Simmonds Streets and lying just to the east of the
Johannesburg Stock Exchange then still in Hollard Street (Figure 2). The 27-storey building was the first of
Johannesburg's genuine tower blocks. Completed in 1970 it has 21 687 sq.m. of office space in a slim 140
metre high tower that is set into a large podium that is below street level. The nett result is that 74 per cent
of the site is left as an open plaza at street level (Hentrich 1970). As if not to be outdone another bank, the
Trust Bank, planned and eventually put up a 124 metre "Miesian tower in pink, highly reflective glass"
(Prinsloo 1971) occupying a whole city block close to the eastern boundary of the CBD. In all, over a period
often years, 60 tower blocks stretched up at the sky reaching well above the former 70 metre bench-mark
set in 1936 by the Anstey Building (The Star 1987; Chipkin 1993).
Those developments, referred to above and that were completed by 1965, contributed to a 34.6 per cent
increase in the floor space of the downtown area over what had existed in 1950. In the same 15 year period
the retail core expanded by 28.7 per cent to 780 000 sq.m., and the office core by a massive 41.7 percent
to just over 856 000 sq.m. with well over 100 000 sq.m. still in the construction phase. Yet the expansion,
either completed by 1965, or already approved by that date, marked an end to further growth. As the
economy slumped in the late 1960s, and again in the second half of the 1970s, no new office towers were
planned and no major additions were made to the lettable space within the CBD (Mandy 1984; The Star
1987; Chipkin 1993).
Despite the optimism that the 'superblock' concept evoked, and although a large number ofsuperblocks'
schemes did assist in reinforcing and promoting the CBD, that cannot be said of the four key developments
that are to be highlighted below and that involved some of the largest corporations and institutions in the
country.
The Carlton Centre Complex
Impressive as the growth in tower blocks that had been planned in the mid-1960s are, it was the
construction of the 200 metre high Carlton Tower, in association with a new Carlton Hotel, and a huge
shopping complex, all sited on a massive 'superblock1, that was most exciting for developers and the public
alike.
Unfortunately, for reasons that will be made clear below, the Carlton Centre complex was not only less
successful than its powerful backers had hoped for but for several reasons it almost certainly did more
damage than good for the CBD as a whole through its effects on the location decision of three other major
'players": the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, the Sanlam assurance company, and the United Building
Society.
Conception of the vast Carlton Centre complex was initially prompted shortly after the aged 'first*
Carlton Hotel in EloffStreet had closed and been demolished in 1964. Given the surprising boom conditions
that favoured the South African economy after the country had withdrawn from the Commonwealth in 1961
so that it could 'protect1 its apartheid policy with a greater level of impunity, and given the advent of the
jumbo jet that would make Johannesburg rather than Cape Town the gateway to southern Africa, the need
was soon felt for a really large business-class hotel that accorded with the highest international standards.
The possibility for actually creating such an hotel arose coincidentally and almost immediately after the
combined potential of the new 'superblock1 concept was realized and fortuitously a large site extending over
two adjacent city blocks (bounded by Fox, Main, Kruis, and von Wielligh Streets, see Figure 2), that had
recently been vacated by the Castle Brewery, became available on the property market. The initial idea for
a super hotel was soon expanded to accord with a new planning movement in the United States where large
multi-level shopping complexes, with office towers and hotels, were being designed for sites in the
'downtowns' of major cities (Mandy 1984). In part the very novelty of the concept that was 'imported' from
the USA might explain why it was not as successful as it might have been in Johannesburg. Nevertheless
there was nothing small about the plan, nor indeed of the concrete and glass complex conceived in the mid-
1960s but only fully completed in 1973.
Once it was realized that the original idea of a large 30-storey 600-room hotel (Mandy 1984) was only
part of what was needed for the venture to be successful, it became clear that the brewery site by itself would
be too small. That in itself was not a great problem. The brewery site, and the city blocks about it, not only
lay outside the hard core of the CBD but one block east of the CBD boundary itself (see Figure 2; City
Engineer 1967). Most of the retail business and major office concentrations lay well west of the proposed
site of the Carlton. It in turn was to be well and truly located in the industrial and semi-industrial southeast
quadrant where land was relatively cheap. Indeed without showing their full face, the then undisclosed main
backers of the scheme, the Anglo-American Company and South African Breweries, eventually assembled
a parcel of properties that were spread over five-and-a-half city blocks (the remaining half block would later
become the site of the IBM headquarters in South Africa). Thereafter, with the agreement of the city council,
the brewery site and the two blocks immediately to the north of them were consolidated into a large
'superblock' bounded by Commissioner, Main, Kruis, and von Wielligh Streets (Figure 2). The council not
only gave permission to close the cross-streets of Fox and Smal, and incorporate them into the holding, but
relaxed a number of other normal requirements. An additional block-and-a-half measuring about 1 300 sq.m.,
lying immediately south of Main Street between Kruis and von Wielligh, was acquired and consolidated
across Smal Street but had later to be linked to the northern 'superblock1 by communal basements as Main
Street could not be closed off. The result was a 2.63 hectare site that could be developed as a unit with the
assistance of a 'co-operative' of top planning and architectural firms from the United States and from
Johannesburg (Mandy 1984).
The Carlton scheme when planned in the mid-1960s was for 325 000 sq.m. of floor space, giving a total
building bulk of just over 12 times the land area, but with more than 50 per cent of the site left open at street
level (Simpson 1970; Mandy 1984). The 50-storey office tower contains 62 450 sq.m. of lettable space,
virtually three times as much as the then next largest commercial office block in the country (Hoffe 1973).
Two floors, with a total of 38 000 sq.m. for shopping and service businesses, are located below the street-
level plaza that in turn is overlooked by the hotel to the south and the tower block to the east. Only the top
floor of the five-floor full-line department store on the northwest corner showed on the street-level facing
Commissioner Street. Beneath the shopping levels are three basements that could have provided parking for
3 000 cars but were restricted to 2 000 bays by the city council (Mandy 1984).
Notwithstanding the hype that accompanied the announcement of the plans, and an early start to the
massive 30 metre deep excavations for the foundations, a number of factors were to delay the completion
of the building. Although the perceived virtues of a site clearly located beyond the periphery of the CBD
were extolled (Mallows and Beinart 1966), the fact remained that when completed the shopping complex
of the Carlton Centre would lie at least two blocks south and two blocks east of the quality retail frontage
of the Eloff Street shopping area. About half the length of the two routes that would have to be traversed
by pedestrian shoppers in the CBD, who also wished to shop at the Carlton Centre, was lined by buildings
that presented dead commercial frontage. As such the Carlton shops would not be able to rely on a natural
share of CBD 'passing trade' but from the outset had to aim at attracting shoppers who would make
purposeful visits. In that respect the Carlton complex was fortunate to have a substantial amount of basement
parking that would be used by its more affluent customers.
In the six years that would elapse before the shopping component was opened, however, other events
and developments would hinder its possible integration with the retail core of Johannesburg. Not least was
the accelerating trend that had already emerged towards larger better-equipped suburban shopping centres
with off-street parking, particularly in the wealthy zones of the northern suburbs. The Carlton, and other
CBD businesses, also had to contend with what was believed to be an ill-conceived and poorly managed
traffic and parking policy. One that prescribed a low maximum number of off-street (usually basement)
parking bays per unit area of building for businesses in the central parts of the CBD (Mandy 1984). There
was also a major slump in the South African economy after 1969 and, with the exception of a small blip in
the early 1970s, it continued throughout the decade. The slump contributed to the withdrawal of a number
of prospective tenants, and also slowed up the building programme. Consequently when the shopping-levels
of the Carlton were ready for trading the only tenants on opening day were the department store and 14 other
shops scattered throughout the 38 000 sq.m. 'underground mall' that could (and admittedly later would)
accommodate two department stores and 150 to 170 smaller businesses (Hoffe 1973; Mandy 1984).
Significantly, however, just as the full range of Carlton Centre shops were opening some of Johannesburg's
oldest and most prestigious department stores in the retail core were closing, or were about to open major
branches in the northern suburbs as a prelude to departing from the CBD in favour of suburban locations.
The anticipated thousands of'captive' shoppers who would work on all 50 of the floors in the office tower
were also slow to materialize with only about half of it let by mid-1973 (Hoffe 1973). The hotel unit,
however, was an immediate success. Not only did the Carlton Hotel assume the status of the premier hotel
in the country but a large annex, the Carlton Court, was later opened on the northwest corner of Kruis and
Main Street and linked to the main hotel by a skywalk.
So although the Carlton shopping and business centre would be successful for a while, and particularly
in the days when the novelty factor was high (see Hoffe 1973), any real hope that it was a natural extension
of the retail core situated along the Pritchard and Eloff Street axis, let alone a new heart of the CBD, was
soon lost (Tomaselli and Mabin 1972). Furthermore, because the presence of the Carlton had pushed
speculative land values steeply upward in adjacent city blocks, there was no immediate flush of new towers
rising nearby.
Significantly the Carlton Centre bucked the apartheid laws at an early stage. The first restaurant without
a liquor licence to be officially open to all races in Johannesburg was located on the observation deck of the
Carlton tower, and black people were made to feel welcome at the Centre. Furthermore, just as Anstey's had
found itself on the direct line of the entrance and exit for white passengers at the Johannesburg railway
station so the Carlton Centre, although much farther south, was linked almost directly by Smal and Hoek
Streets (Figure 2) with the entrance and exit of the station for black passengers.
The Carlton Centre did attract two tower blocks to its immediate vicinity. One was the Kine Centre, a
26-floor office building with a leasable area of 26 500 sq.m. erected on the northeast corner of the
Commissioner and Kruis Streets intersection (across the road from the Carlton complex) and formerly
occupied by the Empire Theatre. With only a meager amount of retail space tucked into a small 'arcade' the
Kine Centre did little to enhance the shopping links that were so desperately needed between the Carlton
shops and the fashionable parts of Eloff Street. The other subsidiary development came in the form of the
new national headquarters for IBM in South Africa. The American computer company specifically wanted
to be near the five-star hotel so that their executives and high-profile customers flying in to Johannesburg
could be well accommodated just across the road (Clarke 1979). The only site near the Carlton Hotel (the
half block that had not been included in the original Carlton property amalgamation) was a mere 2 787 sq.m.
The IBM requirements were for a building with 20 000 sq.m. of usable office space; almost literally a tall
order for such a small site! Construction of a 20-storey building, to be clad entirely in black glass,
commenced in 1972 and spanned two years. The result was a building that was considered to be
architecturally exciting and it became only the second building in South Africa after the Standard Bank
Centre to be featured in the highly regarded A rchitectural Review (see Mallows and Mallows 1976). Clearly
it was anticipated that the real impact of the IBM development would only be felt in the future. In the review
of the building the claim is made that its "day will come only after the run-down area to the south is
developed" (Mallows and Mallows 1976) and other major business organizations have taken up locations
nearby.
The Stock Exchange Goes West
In the years 1964 to 1973 persons and companies that held properties in the city blocks surrounding the
Carlton 'superblock1 were caught up in the euphoria precipitated by the 1964 announcement of the Carlton
project and the construction phase that followed a little later. Many of them thought that the Johannesburg
Stock Exchange (JSE), already cramped for space in Hollard Street, would eagerly move east to their
vicinity. They also believed that such a shift by the JSE would act as a catalyst in encouraging other investors
to construct office towers nearby to house an associated drift of financial businesses from locations near
Hollard Street in the western half of the CBD (Bryant 1987). As such the Carlton complex, coupled with
the JSE, would indeed have defined the new heart of the CBD. Not surprisingly while the 'bulls' were
rampant on the JSE between 1967 and part of 1969, the asking price for properties in the vicinity of the
Carlton 'superblock1 seemed to rise even more rapidly that did the tower section itself. As a consequence the
Stock Exchange managers, who as might be expected were not complete fools in money matters, formed
a building committee in 1969 and charged it with the task of not only searching in secret for a suitable new
site but to go ahead and buy it at the lowest possible price (see Bryant 1987 107-10). The committee
inevitably turned its 'eyes' westwards towards Newtown and those parts of the city where prices were not
inflated.
In 1969 Newtown was in a state of decay, due in no small measure to the continued indecision of the
Council about the future of the area. Plans made in 1965 were already being implemented to close and move
the abattoir and the fresh-produce market to a new site at the old City Deep Mine well to the east of the city.
The tramsheds just west of West Street, and adjacent to the 'central' power station, were vacant and derelict
but no development plan for the Newtown area had emerged. As might be expected the land to the east,
between West and Diagonal Streets, was not only affected by the indecision of what to do with Newtown
but it lay in the 'twilight zone' that had been disregarded by serious white investors since 1887.
The building committee of the JSE soon found a large piece of land occupying most of the block
between West, Diagonal, Kerk, and Pritchard Streets (Figure 2). It was occupied by the defunct premises
of a factory and owned by Union Flour Mills. Through a chance friendship between the chairman of the flour
company and the president of the JSE, the land not only changed hands for a mere Rl .8 million (at a time
when the exchange rate of the Rand to the US dollar was 1 to 0.75 cents) but the identity of the buyer was
kept secret. The Stock Exchange committee was also shrewd enough to use several front companies to
purchase the whole block to the south and most of the block to the north. Finally the committee submitted
a tender to purchase the only outstanding piece on the northeastern corner of the main site. The property at
issue housed the Newtown Coloured School. Had the tender failed the scheme would have foundered.
Everything, bar the tender, was done in secret. As a result not only were the prices of the specific sites
needed for the new exchange kept low but no-one else tendered for the school site. Nevertheless once it had
declared itself, in August 1970 (Bryant 1987), the JSE was in a position to profit from selling off most of
the land it did not need for itself The surplus land was purchased by developers and institutions that wished
to be close to the exchange. Clearly the JSE had intended to profit from its endeavours and it did. In real
terms the main site that is now occupied by the Exchange cost the JSE managers very little indeed.
With a site secured but with the stock market in a down-swing, planning for the new JSE building
began in earnest only in 1973 when the national stock market was showing signs of revival. In the belief that
the economy was about to boom again the first design proposed was for a 36-storey building, with more
lettable floor space than contained in the taller Carlton tower. It was intended that the new building would
not only house brokers and other financial firms and institutions but that it would be the focal point of a
whole new financial district which would coalesce with Newtown when the latter area was upgraded (Bryant
1987). Stock markets, however, are fickle creatures and when it was rudely gripped and pulled down by the
'bears' at the end of 1975, before plans for the proposed tower block had been accepted, a major re-
assessment seemed propitious. The outcome was a building of only 10 storeys facing onto Diagonal Street
and completed in 1978. It had been planned so that it would be occupied almost entirely by firms of brokers
with space for the trading halls and offices of the exchange itself. Other financial firms that deemed Diagonal
Street a desirable address, and brokerages that needed additional space in bullish times, would have to look
to office developers or their own resources in order to be near the exchange if they wished it. The effect of
the JSE announcement in 1970 naturally pushed up land prices in the Diagonal Street area.
Before considering other developments associated with super-block developments it is appropriate to
take note of decentralization trends in respect of both retailing and offices between the early sixties and mid-
seventies.
Retail Decentralization
From the early 1960s onwards the spread and growth of what were then termed planned suburban
shopping centres (analogous to small malls in today's parlance) was gathering momentum. The first of the
malls, the Southdale mall, had opened in the southern suburb of Robertsham in 1963. The Killarney mall was
opened in 1966, set in the midst of the upper-income but low-rise Killarney apartment cluster. A year after
the creation of the new municipality of Sandton plans were passed for a mall of 30 000 sq.m. called Sandton
City that together with a tower block containing 20 floors of office space above the shopping podium, would
form the nucleus of the CBD for the new town. Over the next ten years malls opened in three of Sandton's
suburbs, namely Benmore, Hyde Park, and Bryanston. Malls also opened in the neighbouring municipalities
of Bedfordview, and Randburg, as well as in the Johannesburg suburbs of Brixton, Blackheath, and Cresta
(Sapoa 1993, 1995). In Rosebank the decentralized shopping facilities, with convenient off-street parking,
at and near the intersection of Tyrwhitt Avenue and Oxford Roads, had become increasingly popular since
the early 1950s. In the 1970s the nucleation was reinforced by the addition of two malls, the Mall of
Rosebank and the Firs both catering specifically for the tastes of upper-income spenders.
The pattern and quantity of decentralized businesses changed dramatically between 1959 and the mid-
1970s. Whereas local government figures for decentralized retailing in 1959 highlights only Rosebank in the
northern suburbs with 104 shops (Marshall 1959) a survey of the northern suburbs undertaken in 1975/76
identified 108 locations where the number of shops ranged from small isolated food stores to the CBD of
Randburg with 264 businesses and the Rosebank nucleation on Oxford Road with 227 (Beavon 1980).
Office Decentralization
For reasons already stated Braamfontein is not a simple extension of the CBD. As such the offices
located there must be seen as a first step in the process of decentralization of office-based businesses from
the CBD. The novel appeal of the sleek tower blocks, planned and constructed in the downtown between
1964 and 1975, served as some form of counterbalance to office decentralization from the CBD. The world
energy crisis of 1973, however, aggravated in South Africa when there was a four-fold increase in the cost
of electricity in the late 1970s (Mandy 1984), soon had a significant impact on the design of, and preference
by tenants for, energy-efficient accommodation. The tall, mainly glass-clad buildings of Johannesburg, along
with similar buildings throughout the developed world, were shown to be energy inefficient. Solar build-ups
of heat within the buildings required sophisticated and energy-consuming air-conditioning systems that
increased the running costs and consequently the rents. It became apparent that whereas in terms of the ratio
of floor area to external walling the most cost-effective design for a building is a cube, for optimal thermal
transmission the ideal shape is a half-cube (Standard Bank 1990). Not surprisingly a combination of inertia
and a lack of suitable alternative sites meant that many concentrations of tall office blocks throughout the
world were simply unable to relocate to new more energy-efficient buildings. Johannesburg was not one of
them. Because of the pattern of low-density development in the suburbs there was an abundance of
opportunities for new office clusters provided the objections to office penetration by residents in the suburbs
could be overcome.
Office-based activities wishing to operate in low-rise, areally extensive, and energy-efficient buildings
began acquiring relatively cheap land in the suburb of Parktown just north of Braamfontein. In the 1970s
sales of the large stands in the former high-status residential suburb were being encouraged by a combination
of a rising municipal rate and an aging population of land-owners. Other office-based businesses that wanted
a location near a retail node, mainly for the convenience of their workers, began acquiring land, and erecting
offices, in the residential areas on the periphery of the Rosebank retail nucleation. In a survey undertaken
in 1972 it was found that there were 358 firms employing 6 503 people, and occupying 103 700 sq.m. of
office space in the downtown area, that were seeking to move to various decentralized locations in greater
Johannesburg. The most preferred of the destinations were in Braamfontein, Parktown, Rosebank, Sandton,
and Randburg (Cohen 1973). It was only after 1976 and through the 1980s that office decentralization
gathered significant momentum.
Notwithstanding the relative and absolute decline in the fortunes of the CBD, and in the extent and
quality of its hard core, the overall effects of the post-war developments that took place in the white areas
of Johannesburg were ones of consolidation and augmentation of urban amenities and opportunities for the
city's white citizens. It should be noted that by 1965 there were 46 of the country's top 100 firms
headquartered in Johannesburg. By 1975 that had grown to 56 with most of them still located in the central
area (Rogerson 1984). As indicated in the discussion above, the extension of shopping and business facilities
into the suburbs accelerated after the mid-1960s and was indeed in part a reaction to the greater congestion
in the CBD. It was also a reflection of the growing bulge of areal expansion and concomitant affluence into
the northern suburbs (Figure 1). Associated with that pattern was a continuous northwards shift ofthe centre
of gravity of a considerable amount of spending power.
In the central area ofthe city an additional set of moves by major companies to positions just outside
the CBD boundary continued, and some ofthe most notable are considered next.
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Other Significant Moves away from the CBD Core
In order to pick up the 'narrative' of commercial change in the CBD the discussion here commences with
a further consideration of the effect of relocating the stock exchange. The new Johannesburg Stock
Exchange building, facing onto the west side of Diagonal Street (Figure 2), was completed and occupied at
the end of 1978. Later an annex was built on some of the adjacent land it owned on the northern side of Kerk
Street. Not only was the main Exchange building smaller than the 36-storey structure originally anticipated
but the part of'town' in which the Stock Exchange found itself at the beginning of 1979, alongside a decayed
and decrepit Newtown, was still without an approved development plan. Thus, just as the Carlton complex
had failed to quickly attract a really significant number of additional high-rise office developments to its
immediate locality, so too with the Exchange. The one notable exception was the 32-storey AA Life Centre,
with 55 000 sq.m. of office space on the 'superblock' bounded by Commissioner, Kort, Market, and Diagonal
Streets (Clarke 1979) (Figure 2). The assurance company, who owned the building let out surplus space to
stock brokers and the building was virtually fully occupied until 1986. The most conspicuous of the new
buildings was at 11 Diagonal Street just south of the JSE. Shaped to resemble a modified tetrahedron the
entirely dark-glass clad building designed by an American architect contains 33 000 sq.m. of prestige office
space and is partly occupied by Anglo American Property Services.
Notwithstanding the fact that some additional office space was attracted to what has been termed the
Exchange District, in a physical sense the JSE found itself isolated from the main core of the CBD's financial
houses. In addition persons working in the JSE were no longer close to the high-order retailers scattered
throughout the older financial district of the CBD. The Exchange instead was surrounded by the small-shops
and other businesses that were owned and run by the Indian and Asian community, many of whom lived just
above or behind their business premises, and that catered mainly to a Black clientele. Furthermore, as the
Indian community in the vicinity of Diagonal Street was, and for some time had been, under threat of being
removed at short notice in terms of the Group Areas Act, the area in which they lived and worked contained
a noticeable amount of physical blight. A consequence of the visible decay, caused by the lack of a
development plan for Newtown and the area west of Diagonal Street, and government threats to enforce race
controls at an unspecified future date, meant that the Exchange District did not attract the high-order central
business activities that one might normally have expected in its vicinity. By the same token the distant retail
core lost at least some of the purchasing power of people who worked in or about the new JSE building and
AA Life tower block. It must be remembered that unlike most major cities in the world Johannesburg has
no underground railway or metro system, the bus service was poor other than at peak hours, and there were
no cruising cabs to carry people across the downtown.
Another loss of clientele for retailers in the hard core of the CBD was brought about when the Standard
Bank became the first major business in Johannesburg to respond to the need for energy savings in their
building following the impact of the energy crisis of the earlier 1970s. By 1978 the 27-storey tower they had
erected eight years earlier in Fox Street was inadequate for their needs, and the Bank's 25 headquarter
departments had already spilled out into 10 other buildings. Plans for a new building were commissioned with
a stipulation that it be energy efficient. As a consequence the new building that was designed in 1979
contained 86 000 sq.m. of floor space spread over only 5 levels of offices, two basement parking areas, and
a recreational floor; that is 3 8 per cent more space than in the 50-storey office tower of the Carlton. The need
for a site that would allow the Bank to have expansive floors, each of about 10 000 sq.m., prompted
Standard to look outside of the CBD boundary. Almost inevitably, and particularly in light of the comments
made earlier about the location decisions taken for the other key developments that have been highlighted
for the downtown area, the Standard Bank acquired cheap ground located not only in the decaying industrial
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and 'motortown' area, south of the CBD boundary, but in the otherwise neglected southwestern quadrant
of the downtown. The site also lies immediately above some of the earliest gold workings. More precisely,
the Bank acquired and created a 'superblock' bounded by Simmonds, Thorpe, Harrison, and Frederick Streets
(Figure 2). Standard also purchased land for future expansion on the west side of Simmonds Street directly
opposite the new site. There a similar low-rise but somewhat grander building, linked by a skywalk to the
first, was completed in the second half of the 1980s almost exactly a 100 years after Standard was the first
bank to open in Johannesburg. The nett result is a headquarters that is south of the 1965 CBD boundary and
just within the downtown 'box' laid out in 1887. The building was designed to enclose 120 000 sq.m. of
office accommodation, and have its own canteens, dinning rooms, and recreational areas, with a daily
workforce of some 7 000 people (Standard Bank, 1982, 1990; Mandy 1984).
Whereas Standard Bank, in its search for suitable land for its enlarged headquarters, had been happy to
locate on the northern edge of the 'motortown' and industrial area that choice was not good for the hard core
of the CBD. The new building was and is just too far way, and too self-contained, for the large workforce
to support the shops in the heart of the CBD during lunch hours. As such the relocation of the Bank's
headquarters further undermined the support base for the leading CBD retailers in the CBD.
The large assurance firm of Sanlam had selected a 'superblock1 location on the northeast of the CBD
boundary, just beyond the zone of increased property prices inspired by the Carlton development. Although
its new 38-storey headquarters was ready for occupation by 1976 no major ancillary central business
development was immediately attracted to its vicinity. In the early 1980s, however, most of the two city
blocks directly to the west were consolidated into a 'superblock' to be used not for retailing or offices but
as a site for a new five-star hotel, the Johannesburg Sun (Figure 2). Unfortunately the 40-storey hotel with
800 rooms was ill-timed and was consequently a poorly located venture doomed to early failure.
Changes in Central City Retailing:
The Increasing Influence of the Large Malls, 1976-1990
The total purchasing power of the Black community who worked in Johannesburg began to increase
significantly after 1976 as wages for a whole echelon of Black employees were pushed up (admittedly from
a low base) in the wake of the Soweto Revolt (Mandy 1984). After 1976 many CBD office-based businesses
began to ignore the strictures of the apartheid laws and employed a growing number of black clerical staff
In 1960 the ratio of white to black employees in the CBD had been 7:1 but as early as 1970 that had changed
and was 2:1 and continued to move in favour of black employees albeit at junior levels. By 1976 the Black
population at large out-numbered the whites by 2 to 1 and given the poor provision of shops and services
in the Black areas it was clear that the economic base of retailing in the CBD, still the most accessible point
on the Witwatersrand, would become increasingly the service centre for Black people (Mandy 1984).
In 1978 when the CBD businesses that had always relied primarily on white customers were already
under pressure from a fall-offin sales the first of the new mega-malls was set to make an appearance. Named
Eastgate it was located at a major access and egress point of the new Witwatersrand freeway system linking
the eastern suburbs of Johannesburg to the international airport in Kempton Park and to other East Rand
towns, notably Germiston, Bedfordview, Edenvale, Boksburg, and Benoni (Figure 3).
When it opened in 1979 Eastgate contained 90 000 sq.m. of shopping and business. As such it had twice
the retail and service business area of the Carlton Centre and was three times as large as the Sandton City
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Mall until then the biggest in the metropolitan area. Eastgate also secured large branches of OK Bazaars,
Edgars, Wool worths, Greaterman's, and John Orr's all of which had their 'flagship' stores in the CBD of
Johannesburg. By 1982 the cumulative effect of the emerging malls (Figure 3), and other up-market shopping
clusters catering for the upper-income customers of the wealthy (mainly northern) Johannesburg suburbs,
in addition to those in the neighbouring municipalities, saw most of the big-spending shoppers lost to the
CBD. As a consequence the major department stores of John Orr's and Stuttafords had little choice but to
open additional premises in the areas where their former customers now wished to shop. By 1983 the CBD
that had already lost Anstey's saw the departure and closure of Greaterman's, Stuttafords, and John Orr's
(Mandy 1984) and some of the small dependent businesses. The vacated CBD premises were almost
immediately taken over by other businesses but ones that offered lower-order and more utilitarian goods and
services that would match the pockets and needs of an ever more predominant Black clientele. One whose
mores and customs were markedly different from that which had preceded it.
With the continuing growth of a wide range of good shopping in the white suburbs it was not surprising
that in the second half of the 1970s one third of all white shoppers were making their purchases in the
suburban centres alone. Whereas 70 per cent of all shopping in the Johannesburg municipal area was still
made by white people they accounted for only 52 per cent of the total sales in the CBD by 1978 (Mandy
1984). It needs to be noted that it was not the merely that white shoppers were being replaced by Black
shoppers that began to have a noticeable effect on the character of the downtown. Rather it was the fact that
although the overall purchasing power of the Black community was increasingly significant their individual
disposable incomes were not as large as those of the customers who were now shopping elsewhere.
Consequently the type of goods stocked in the CBD shops was changing markedly. Whereas it would
become increasingly difficult to find high-order internationally-branded luxury items in CBD shops it became
increasingly easy to buy the types of items needed by householders living in townships where the bulk of
houses were still without electricity. In keeping with the changes the clusters of small shops that had earlier
been located only on the periphery of the downtown area, and mainly near the transport terminals, began to
increase in numbers and to choose locations within the CBD boundary. An expansion of such businesses
southward was particularly noticeable from the area on the southeastern side of the main railway station and
bounded by Noord, Plein, Hoek and Klein Streets (see Figure 2). A 1982 sample of 1 300 businesses in the
CBD showed that no more than 500 of them still had only white shop assistants and 220 were under Indian
management (Mandy 1984). As part of the process of change more black shop-owners were operating
businesses in the downtown area of Johannesburg regardless of what was prescribed by law. For the Indian
traders in the CBD it was the achievement of the goal their forefathers had held but been denied a hundred
years before.
As the number of white shoppers in the heart of the CBD declined so did the locational attributes of
certain sites and streets. Although a new sense of inevitable change was in the air formal and enforced
apartheid still operated. Consequently when Eloff Street was turned into a busway, in an attempt to boost
pedestrian flows past the shops, most of the busses that moved along it carried and off-loaded white
passengers. The majority of the black commuters who were still using the trains to get to Johannesburg
entered the CBD from the southeastern corner of the main station buildings. From there they moved south
into the CBD heading mainly along Smal Street. Given that the Carlton Centre was not only located opposite
the southern end of Smal Street, and from inception it had succeeded in its attempt to attract black people
to its shopping facilities, by the late 1980s Smal Street had replaced Eloff Street in terms of the hustle and
bustle of pedestrians if not in the order of commodities that had once characterized the latter. In an attempt
to adjust to the changing realities of the downtown the Johannesburg CBD Association played a leading role
in having Smai Street pedestrianized. Although it was still cut by east-west traffic-carrying roads between
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Bree and Commissioner Streets the 'walkway' lined with small shops became known as the Smal Street Mall.
Although not discussed in any detail here there were massive changes to the demographic structure of
the Hillbrow and Joubert Park residential areas after 1976 when many of the wealthy white people left the
area. The nett result was that by the 1980s the type of spending power in the nearby and adjacent high-rise
apartment zones had changed and offered less support to the type of shops that had characterized the CBD
for many generations and were now seeing their customer thresholds crumble.
Office Decentralization: a Period of
Indecision, 1976 to the Early 1990s
The movement of offices into the suburban areas of northern Johannesburg, and excluding the
Braamfontein node, continued at a gentle pace in the 1970s approximating the average of 70 000 sq.m. per
annum that had been projected by the Town Planning Department in the late 1960s. By 1982 it was estimated
that there was about 350 000 sq.m. of office space in the northern suburbs equal to 9 per cent of the total
office space in Johannesburg as a whole: or about five times the floor space in the Carlton Office tower. The
demand for space did increase in the early 1980s thereby pushing up the rentals that could be charged and
encouraging developers to begin building more offices. Some 431 000 sq.m. of office space were under
construction in the suburbs between 1981 and 1984 vis-a-vis only 205 000 sq.m. in the CBD. One of the
leading office brokers and developers predicted that in the second half of the 1980s demand for suburban
office space would outstrip that for centralized positions in Johannesburg. The city authorities took an
opposite point of view and seemed confident that further office development in the suburbs would be slow
(Mandy 1984).
Certainly the late 1980s was a period of indecision for those who had to make choices about future
office space. The behaviour of the companies who owned large stables of major buildings in the downtown
gave the impression that they saw a rosy future for the CBD once apartheid was scrapped. One of South
Africa's major banks, First National (FNB), not only committed itself to Johannesburg in the mid-1980s but
set about constructing its new headquarters, Bank City, over three city blocks of the CBD not far from the
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (Figure 2). The commitment was indeed massive and the equivalent at the
time of US$ 300 million went into the construction of the building alone. By 1995 FNB had taken occupation
of their building that currently contains 145 000 sq.m. of the planned 200 000 sq.m. of office space, in
addition there was almost 8 000 sq.m. of retail space, and 3 to 4 basement levels of parking (Beavon 1998).
Property firms that really believed that the arrival of the 'new' South Africa would herald a massive demand
for office space in or near the CBD also set about constructing and upgrading office space in the
Braamfontein node. The reality was to be something else.
Of course the movement of office-based activity was not confined only to financial firms and
corporations but it also included the offices of small firms and individual professionals and practitioners.
Particular mention needs to be made of the northward movement of medical practitioners. In the 1950s and
1960s they had been tenants in the finest medical suites in South Africa that in turn were found in the
custom-designed buildings that stretched along Jeppe Street east of Eloff Street (Figure 2). The relative
decline of the major departmental stores and fashion shops vis-a-vis their branches in the suburban malls
meant that many of the private patients who use to shop in the CBD were no longer prepared to make the
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trek into town just to consult with a gynaecologist, dermatologist, or even a surgeon, let alone a general
physician. Instead they preferred to visit the rooms of practices that were opening in the suburbs.
Slowly but surely the city-centre medical practices began to take up rooms in a growing number of
medical clusters centred around private hospital and clinics that were opening and thriving not exclusively
but predominantly in the northern suburbs. As a consequence when leases expired the CBD medical suites
were left vacant and they could not be let for the purpose for which they had been built. Eventually the
former prestige medical suites, and indeed other small offices in vacated CBD buildings, particularly between
Jeppe Street and the main railway line, would be taken over and occupied by people desperate for
accommodation and who in rapidly increasing numbers became the new inner-city residents in the late 1980s
and early 1990s.
Changes in the Geography of Retailing and
Office-Based Activities of the Metropolis
1993-1998
The rapid change in the demographic characteristics of the residential areas closest to the CBD have not
been dealt with here. Suffice it to note that between the late 1980s and 1993 there was a considerable
deterioration in the quality of residential life in the inner-city areas exacerbated by the strife between
landlords and tenants, the retreat of the local authorities in enforcing their own bye-laws, and rising levels
of crime at least some of it drug related. At the same time the numbers of street traders grew astronomically.
It was therefore not surprising to find that the great trek to the northern suburbs, pioneered by retailers and
subsequently followed by an initially small number of office-based and public service businesses in the early
1990s, became more substantial from approximately 1993 onwards. Amongst the first to capitulate was the
5-star Johannesburg Sun with its frontage on the Smal Street Mall. As petty crime, muggings, and even
serious physical assaults on victims both in the Mall and the surrounding area increased, the hotel realized
that its guests (a declining number of business people and international tourists) were at risk in the centre
of Johannesburg. In 1993 the Johannesburg Sun closed and the hotel was re-opened as a down-graded
'Garden Court' under the auspices of Holiday Inn. Even so by 1997 the new owners were only using the top
20 floors of the 40-storey tower to accommodate a decreasing number of guests and as from October 1998
the hotel will close completely.
When there were still no real signs of improvements in the downtown situation following the
'honeymoon' period after the new ANC-dominated councils had taken office, owners of large CBD property
portfolios became restless. Earlier in 1995 some of the major tenants in the most prestigious buildings of the
city began leaving the CBD for the suburbs. By late in the same year there were sizeable vacancies in the
Diamond Building at 11 Diagonal Street, the Carlton Office Tower, and the former IBM headquarter
building opposite the Carlton Hotel had been 100 per cent vacant for at least 18 months. In mid-1996 Anglo
American Properties who own the Carlton Centre and many other city properties formally devalued its
holdings by 37 per cent as it was unable to attract tenants who would pay the rentals required to sustain the
previous value. At the end of 1996 the property division of Old Mutual, and owner of many CBD buildings,
moved out of its own regional headquarter building (building 8 on Figure 2) near Bank City in the CBD and
set up office in Rosebank. From there it continued to attempt the letting of its portfolio of properties located
in the CBD including the very property it had vacated. In April 1997 yet another large assurance company,
with massive property interests in Johannesburg and nationwide, stated that it was freezing investment not
only in the Johannesburg CBD but in all South African CBDs. The company has stated that it will only re-
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commence investment once it is satisfied that the local authorities have got to grips with the rampant crime
and grime that beset the former prime location for offices, where economic rentals can no longer be obtained.
In October 1997 about 60 per cent of the rooms in the 5-star Carlton Hotel were closed off and mothballed.
By May 1998 the Carlton Hotel had closed completely, and the last 5-star hotel in the downtown was lost.
To complete the litany of closures and departures from prestigious buildings alone it should be mentioned
that in May 1998 the 50-storey Carlton Office Tower was 54.3 per cent vacant, the former IBM building was
still 100 per cent vacant; and the Diamond Building at 11 Diagonal Street was 72.7 per cent vacant. The
United States Consulate office in a tower block opposite the Carlton Centre, and almost the last consulate
office still in the city centre, announced in April 1998 that they would close and open new offices in one of
the northern suburbs.
Subsequent to the general election of 1994 Johannesburg became the provincial capital of the newly-
created Province of Gauteng. The old City Hall in the centre of the CBD was selected as the seat of the new
provincial legislature and in effect became the Gauteng Capitol. In the wake of those decisions there was a
demand for 89 000 sq.m. of office space, later rising to 110 000 sq.m (Beavon and Larsen 1998) to house
provincial bureaux in the CBD. Hopes that the acquisition of the Capital functions would prove to be a fillip
to the CBD have not been realized. Most if not all of the space the provincial authorities have occupied in
and about the precincts of the Library Gardens (the remnant of the former Market Square) had been vacated
by businesses moving out to the suburbs. Thus apart from creating a momentary blip on the 'graph' the
vacancy rate in good quality buildings has continued to rise.
Most of the firms that have pulled out of the CBD have headed north to find accommodation in the
rapidly expanding retail and office nodes of the suburbs.
An Emerging Neo-Apartheid City?
When one examines not only the nature and quality of the retailing in the northern wedge of Greater
Johannesburg but also the rate at which it is being expanded vis-a-vis the central city area, then the notion
that a neo-apartheid city form is emerging must be considered. For those not familiar with the emerging
pattern what follows may be useful.
The New Retail Nodes
The basic pattern of retail decentralization, with a focus on large malls, was already in place by the end
of the 1980s (Figure 3). What followed in the 1990s was a virtual shopping explosion based on the earlier
pattern (cf. Figures 3 and 4). It has been estimated that the central area of Johannesburg still contained 700
000 sq.m. of retail space in 1995 (Beavon 1998). Yet as early as 1993 the South African Property Owners'
Association (Sapoa) had recorded that there was already 941 500 sq.m. of retailing outside of the
Johannesburg CBD in 29 malls that were of at least 10 000 sq.m. in size. By 1995 an additional eight malls,
exceeding 10 000 sq.m. each, had been opened and total space in the 37 nodes had increased by 24.3 per cent
to 1 169 827 sq.m. As additions and improvements were made to existing older malls the retail area rose to
1 200 806 by the beginning of 1997 thereby exceeding the CBD retail space by a factor of 1.7. In addition
there are numerous small shopping centres and suburban malls that have less than 10 000 sq.m. of lettable
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space and that are not included in the 1.2 million sq.m. just mentioned (Sapoa 1993, 1995, 1997; Beavon
1998).
Not only is there a substantial amount of shopping space, offering high-order commodities and services,
outside of the CBD in the metropolitan area of Johannesburg but the overwhelming majority of it lies in the
northern suburbs of old 'Johannesburg1; the northern parts of the former municipality of Johannesburg and
its neighbours Randburg and Sandton. As shown on Figure 4 there is relatively little in the way of major
malls south of the Johannesburg CBD. The most glaring 'open space' is to the southwest, the area that
contains Soweto and that by 1997 had only one shopping facility of more than 10 000 sq.m. Little wonder
therefore that so many Sowetans continue to shop in the Johannesburg CBD, and that shops in the CBD
cater more exclusively for Sowetan residents and those from other southern townships than for the tastes
of those residing in the northern suburbs, and who long ago stopped shopping in the CBD.
The location of the shopping malls (Figure 4) is such that even if the CBD of Johannesburg were clean
and crime free, there would now be little need for any residents in the former white suburbs to use it. The
reason being that to reach the CBD they would have to travel past malls that already stock the full range of
items that would normally be found in the centre of a city. In terms of normal shopping behaviour the malls
en route to the CBD would simply 'intercept' the shoppers.
The claim is frequently made in the daily press and in specialist business papers that the owners of retail
properties are doing very well in the central area of Johannesburg. That claim needs to be examined a little
more closely and certainly the perspective of what is happening north of the Witwatersrand ridge needs to
be brought into the equation. Clearly there is a demand for retail space in certain parts of the CBD, and that
includes in particular the frontages along streets that are used by persons to get from major points of
employment to the main transport nodes; the main railway station and the taxi-ranks on the eastern side of
the station, the taxi-ranks in Newtown, and to a lesser extent the minor terminals of Westgate and Faraday
railway station in West and (south) Eloff streets. In the first half of 1998 the top rentals for prime locations
near Bank City were as high as Rl 20 per sq. m. For shops that are not in prime locations, and there are plenty
of them selling lower-order commodities, the rentals were 50 to 70 per cent less. It must also be noted that
by mid-1998 there were whole street blocks where every one of the former retail facilities at street level were
vacant and whose doors and windows have simply been bricked up. Even the Carlton Centre was finding it
difficult to fill its retail premises. In contrast to the Johannesburg CBD the shops of even community-sized
shopping centres in the suburbs are being let at rentals of R90/sq.m. and the many top-line speciality shops
in the plethora of major malls are paying as much as R240/sq.m. and generally in the range of Rl 80 to R200
per sq.m.
Despite the demand for commercial space in the suburbs the spectre of crime and grime creeping
northwards, and making its presence felt in some of the more impressive and successful suburban nodes, is
causing concern to property owners in both the private and public realms. Amongst the nodes feeling the
threat most keenly are those that might be described as 'organic'. They are nodes composed of a mixture of
privately owned and managed malls and high-street type businesses that occupy premises in separate
buildings. The large single-management enclosed malls, many squarely located in the heart of the northern
'wedge' seem to be faring best because they are able to command their whole environment: from parking
areas to passageways, thereby effectively controlling petty criminals, litter-bugs, and unlimited numbers of
informal sector operators.
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Suburban Office Nodes
When it occurred the rapid growth of suburban office space followed a similar pattern of location to that
of the malls (cf. Figure 5 and 4). By the beginning of 1993 A- and B-grade office space in the CBD
amounted to approximately 1.6 million sq.m. and there was already some 2.4 million sq.m. of similar grades
of office space in the suburban nodes. Given its intermediate status between the central area and the northern
suburbs the half a million sq.m. of office space in Braamfontein has been excluded from both zones. The
'expansion' of office space, prompted by the prospects that the events in 1990-91 had seemed to herald, was
completed between 1993 and late-1997 pushing the amount of high-grade office stock in the CBD to 1 732
100 sq.m. By the end of 1997 suburban office space of grades A and B had risen to 2 374 600 sq.m. On the
simple basis of the changing ratio of extra-CBD space to that within the city's business district, from 1.5 in
1993 to 1.8 in 1997, there might at first glance appear to be little cause for concern about a CBD decline.
A closer look at the figures, however, reveals a number of points that would appear to merit serious
reflection on the stability and future of office space in the Johannesburg CBD; space that must be let at high
rentals in order to maintain not only the rateable value of the sites but the physical quality of the buildings
(Beavon 1998; Beavon and Larsen 1998).
Between the beginning of 1993 and the end of 1997 the sap between the total amount of A- and B-
grade office space in the CBD and in the suburbs widened by 86 per cent, from nominally 758 thousand to
1.4 million sq.m. The result is that for every square metre of high-grade office space that has been added to
the Johannesburg CBD 3.7 square metres of similar quality space have been provided elsewhere in the
suburbs. Furthermore the demand for office space outside of the CBD has exceeded that for space within
it by a ratio of 8.6 to 1. To emphasize the magnitude of what has just been outlined consider the following
formulation. If the average amount of vacant office space in the CBD over the period 1990-1997 is compared
to the annual take-up rate in the same area, then by December 1997 there was already sufficient space in the
CBD for at least the next five-and-a-half years. In the case of the decentralized nodes existing supply in 1997
was sufficient for seven months (Beavon and Larsen 1998). By mid-1998 it was being claimed by property
analysts and brokers that the vacancies in the CBD would take 10 years to fill at current take-up rates
whereas there was only a 4 month supply in the suburbs.
So severe and so rapid has the move of offices been that if by chance a magic wand could be waved, and
all the firms that have moved out of the CBD since 1990 were to move back over-night, then there would
be serious problems in the suburbs where massive vacancies would exist. In short the office space available
in the metropolitan area is no longer in equilibrium with total demand.
Until recently the sector between Jan Smuts Avenue and the Ml motorway, from their intersection in
Parktown, has been the zone most sought after by firms either decanting from the CBD or entering
metropolitan Johannesburg for the first time (Figure 6). Since the beginning of 1998 there have been signs
that some businesses, including those that have been in the Parktown node almost since its inception, are
moving to locations elsewhere. The danger is that if top-rated firms move out of Parktown the perception
could well be created that, like Braamfontein, it is considered too far south for comfort and too far away
from the new business centre of gravity that is now located in the Sandton CBD. The amount of A- and B-
grade office space in the Sandton CBD has increased by 87 per cent between 1990 and the end of 1997, and
equal to 63 per cent of what had been in the CBD of Johannesburg as recently as 1990. Sandton in general
is steadily attracting major corporations to what was its former municipal area. In 1994 sixty-three
corporations listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange were headquartered in Sandton (Maher 1994) and
the number had grown to 82 by 1998. The Johannesburg CBD, although still home to the largest single
concentration of listed corporations in South Africa is still ahead but 'houses' only 128 of them.
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As in the case of retailing there are major differences in rentals charged for offices in the Johannesburg
CBD and in the suburbs. Top A-grade space in the CBD of Johannesburg can be had for not more than
R25/sq.m. and, in late 1997, the Carlton Centre in an attempt to lure tenants was offering A-grade office
space at R15/sq.m, In the CBD B-grade space can be had for R15 or less per sq.m. making it the cheapest
office space in terms of quality, not the setting, anywhere in Greater Johannesburg. Establishing an office
in the suburbs is considerably more expensive. Well-positioned A-grade space in Rosebank can cost up to
R70/sq.m. and in both Hyde Park and the Sandton CBD R50/sq.m. is pretty much the minimum. In other
suburban nodes in the northern suburbs wedge (Figure 6) R40 to R45 per sq.m. would be normal even for
B-grade space.
Back in the Johannesburg CBD some former leading office buildings have been 'mothballed' in the sense
that although vacant they are physically maintained and guarded, other have been sealed by bricking up their
doors and windows at the lower levels. In other instances the buildings have genuinely been abandoned,
taken over by vagrants, and in many instances the current backlog of rates and taxes exceeds the value of
the building. Unless a buyer is found for the site the Council cannot even afford to incur the costs associated
with demolishing the building. In several parts of the central city there are now an increasing number of
vacant sites where owners have pulled down their buildings, replaced them with temporary car parks, and
are waiting to see what will happen to the property market in the CBD.
Whether small, medium, and micro-enterprises (the 'pop1-sounding SMMEs) taking up space in former
office blocks of the central area will have any significant affect on the attempts to revive the CBD sufficiently
for it to pay its way in the future, let alone generate the bulk of the income for the city's budget, remains to
be seen.
Changes in the Residential Areas North of the Reef
Crime has never been entirely absent from the residential areas of Johannesburg. Even so as the
incidence of crime in the suburbs increased dramatically in the 1990s so did the costs of protecting property.
Consequently from the early 1990s there has been a growing preference among many buyers of dwelling
units for smaller more easily protected properties. As a result large numbers of cluster units, various forms
of townhouses, and other types of'gash' (good address small house) accommodation have mushroomed
relative to the proverbial 'large house on large stand with pool' so typical of the older areas in the northern
suburbs. Much of the first waves of the new more densely developed style of residential living were sited
where relatively cheap land was available; notably on the periphery of the metropolitan area and particularly
but not exclusively in the north and northwestern sectors (see Figure 1) that were formerly part of the
independent municipalities of Sandton and Randburg.
As the new 'lock-and-go' style of living became more popular so property prices for large houses on
large stands began to stagnate and even fall, pushed down in part by interest rates that have soared to about
20 per cent. Generally speaking large properties became more difficult to sell than had been the case for
years. In many of the older established suburbs property developers have stepped in, and taking advantage
of the situation just mentioned, have acquired sets of adjacent properties on which they have then built
clusters of gash housing. Consequently the residential densities in small pockets of the north are now higher
than ever before although by northern hemisphere standards, or by the standards in black townships, they
remain ridiculously low.
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The northern periphery of greater Johannesburg has a history of being a profitable area for property
developers and has attracted a mixture of first-time home-owners and those seeking greater value for their
money. Nevertheless the previous generation who bought on the northern rim faced a long journey to work
in the central area of Johannesburg where large numbers of them were employed. As the volume of traffic
from the spreading periphery increased so the arterial roads to the centre became more congested at peak
hours and lengthened the travel times. In recent years that scenario has changed. As large amounts of
decentralized retail and office-based business have concentrated not only in the northern wedge but in the
northern parts of that wedge (cf. Figures 4, 5, and 6), the residential developments north of the old
Johannesburg municipal boundary have proved to be much more attractive than in the past. Consequently
each year more gash houses and more shops and offices have been attracted to the northern periphery with
the CBD of Sandton assuming an increasingly important and even geographically central position.
Naturally, given the racial zonings of the past and the inevitable inertia of those patterns, it follows that
the new trends in residential living, north of the line of the Reef, have undoubtedly favoured white people
more than they have Black residents. Even though there are no longer any racial barriers to where one might
live, the northern 'wedge' (Figure 6) and the suburbs adjacent to its western side remain overwhelmingly
white.
Although the only barrier to entering any residential area is price in reality that alone creates a form of
de facto apartheid. There are a significant number of well-positioned and wealthy black people now living
in many of the expensive northern suburbs. Yet the overwhelming majority of Black people remain literally
and figuratively on the margins, largely as a consequence of the cards dealt them in the apartheid years when
they were growing up, seeking an education, and searching for a good job.
As might have been expected the movement into white areas by black people purchasing houses in the
1990s has been greatest in suburbs on the southwestern side of the city and least in the north. Unfortunately
there is no published analysis based on a definitive data set of property transactions for the last decade. On
the basis of a small non-random sample of 9 000 transactions in greater Johannesburg between 1993-1996,
it has been noted that the percentage of houses purchased by black people in the former whites-only suburbs
in the southwest ranged from 63 per cent in Naturena to a mere 3 per cent in Rosettenville. In the northern
suburbs sales to black buyers amounted to only one or two per cent of all sales made but 56 per cent of those
purchases were for upmarket properties in the Sandton suburb of Bryanston (Prinsloo 1997). In simple terms
the 'picture' that emerges is one of'business as usual' with no real signs of genuine inter-mingling of races
in the former whites-only suburbs being visible by 1998.
Hopes were at one time high that upgrading or gentrification might act as a powerful force for renewal
of some of the older, more run-down, sections of inner-residential suburbs such as found in and between
Bertrams and Bezuidenhout Valley, Kensington, Malvern, and Jeppe on the eastern side of the Johannesburg
CBD. Gentrification had occurred and appeared to be very successful particularly in some of the inner
western suburbs notably in Mayfair, Mellville, Richmond, and Brixton. Unfortunately the rapid decline of
the CBD and the increasing attractions much farther north have dampened the future prospects for the type
of renewal that appeared possible in other parts of the inner suburbs.
In the high-rise inner-apartment zone, with the notable exception of certain blocks of apartments
towards the crest of the north-facing slopes of Hillbrow and the Berea, living conditions have not improved
since 1991. Attempts to establish co-operative housing schemes in a number of apartment blocks where
'owner'-occupiers would undertake their own upgrading and maintenance have also not been as successful
as was hoped.
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By 1989 the 50-storey Ponte apartment block in Berea had lost the status it held in the 1970s as
Johannesburg's premier yuppie address. In 1998 the government was seriously considering how it might be
converted into a one-stop combination police station, court, and prison. The idea being that Johannesburg's
criminals would be booked, held for trial, tried, and if convicted serve their sentence, whether short or long
term, all in the 50-storey Ponte building.
In attempting to conclude this paper some mention must be made of the most recent plan that city
officials believe will provide the remedy for the malaise of the central area, and the role that the private sector
believed a casino would play.
Mavivuke and other Plans to Revitalize the CBD
Attempts to manage, if not to control, what was happening in the central area of the city on the one
hand, and to co-ordinate, if not to direct, the mushrooming extra-CBD developments on the other, were not
really successful during the interregnum filled by the Metropolitan Chamber (Central Witwatersrand
Metropolitan Chamber 1992, 1993). Consequently the business community in the CBD and elsewhere, as
well as members of the public, eagerly awaited signs that a firm hand had been placed on the levers of the
municipal machine following the local government elections in November 1995. There were soon signs that
something positive was happening but whether it would be successful was another matter.
In November 1995 the property management arm of the railway commuter corporation, with assistance
from both the national government and the local authority, was able to negotiate the move of the resident
squatters from the main railway station to shelters elsewhere both inside the CBD and beyond Johannesburg.
With the squatters gone serious renovation of the station and its precinct was commenced but the malaise
that had gripped the CBD earlier continued. What seem to have been genuine attempts by the CJP and the
Council to work co-operatively with the operators in the informal sector, and with the taxi industry,
continued to break down, be revived, only to break down again. Petty and more serious crime escalated and
calls for better policing could not be met successfully. Satellite police stations were opened in the CBD and
then closed.
In part the problems of governing the city were caused by massive financial shortages for a whole variety
of reasons. Nevertheless in July 1997 what was billed as the most ambitious plan ever for reviving the CBD
was officially launched by Thabo Mbeki, the Deputy President of the country. Styled the Johannesburg
Mavivuke Project (or Johannesburg Awake) the plan drawn up under the auspices of the Metropolitan
Council is to upgrade the transportation terminals and their associated taxi ranks, provide a more controlled
environment within which hawkers and pavement sellers will operate in the informal sector, improve the
cleansing of the inner city, and cut back on crime by better more efficient use of policing methods on the city
streets. The private sector agreed to carry a significant proportion of the cost, an indication of how seriously
business has viewed the decline of the central area. It was therefore disturbing that in the same month it was
revealed that, based on the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council's operating estimates for 1997-98,
the Council planned to spend more on food, furniture, festive illuminations, and travel allowances for
councillors and staffthan it did on repair and maintenance of roads, ambulances, safety equipment, and anti-
litter campaigns.
By June 1998 some progress had been made on the construction of the taxi ranks, the renovation of the
railway station was complete, but the drain of major businesses out of the CBD and closure of prestigious
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major buildings in the central area, as described earlier in this chapter continued virtually unabated. In
addition installation of the much publicized closed-circuit TV that was to help combat street crime in the
central area, announced in April 1997, had not yet commenced and it appeared it could no longer be
afforded.
While the city officials were pinning their hopes for reviving the CBD on the success of the Mayivuke
project at least two syndicates of business people were placing their hopes on the roulette wheel, at least in
the figurative sense. Some business people believe that a Vegas-style casino in the CBD of Johannesburg
would revive the city. One group put forward a bid that had the Carlton Centre as its focal point and another
syndicate proposed a location in Newtown. There were a number of other bids including one that was
intended to be based in Soweto.
When the Gauteng Gambling and Betting Board announced the names of the successful bids in February
1998 the list of four did not include any of the three just mentioned. Not only was the CBD to be denied a
casino but two of the successful bids were for casinos located not only on the current edge of the
metropolitan area but on the northern half of it. As such they are most likely to have a detrimental impact
on the business revival hopes of the CBD and, at least initially, attract a good measure of new retailing and
hotels to their locations. It is of course a moot point whether a casino at say the Carlton Centre would really
have revived the whole CBD of Johannesburg. Nevertheless it was at about the time of the casino
announcement that the Carlton Hotel decided to close its doors and thereby in a very symbolic manner the
southeast sector of the CBD announced its demise as a central point for high-order commodities and
services.
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2. The position of 'superblocks' in the downtown area together with the shrinking CBD
boundaries of 1959 and 1965. The main access routes from the south are indicated
diagrammatically along with the bridges over the railway lines to the north. The numbered
blocks are: 1. Edura House; 2. Standard Bank Centre; 3. Carlton Complex; 4. Carlton Centre
Extension; 5. United (ABSA) Tower and current extensions (just to the north); 6. Sanlam
Centre; 7. Johannesburg Sun Hotel (now closed); 8. Old Mutual's 1066; 9. Bank City (three
blocks); 10. Johannesburg Stock Exchange; 11. Diamond Building or 11 Diagonal Street; 12
Magistrates Courts; 13. Standard Bank Headquarters (two blocks).
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3. The distribution of shopping malls of at least 10 000 sq.m. in size. The position of Eastgate,
the first of the super-malls, is indicated with an asterisk star.
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The distribution of shopping malls (at least 10 000 sq.m. in size) that opened and grew between
1990 and 1997.
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'• The northern 'wedge' of metropolitan Johannesburg which contains the most sort-after sites for
new malls and office developments (modified from Beavon 1997).
